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mask and carrying a sawed off shotgun entered the store and
demanded money (T. 51-52).

After receiving the money and putting

it in a denim bag, the person left the store (T. 55, 76).
Audrey Robinson, Appellant's sister, testified that her
brother was at her home on August 21, 1988, and stayed there
while Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus took the car to drive
Genora home (T.2 48-50).
After the robbery, Julie Lund saw the robber enter a
white compact car with two women in it, and testified that she
recognized one of the women in the car as a person who had been
in the Payless store a few hours before the robbery (T. 78).
Nanci Condi was in her car with her three children in
the vicinity of the robbery on the day of the robbery, and she
saw a man with something pink on his head who stuffed something
into a bag and jumped into a white compact car (T. 86-88).

Ms.

Condi was unable to identify the man after the robbery because
she never saw his face (T. 93).
Officer Kory Newbold was on his way to investigate the
robbery at the Payless shoe store, when he saw a vehicle with
three occupants, who he thought were Mexicans (T. 115-116).

The

dispatch report indicated that the Payless store had been robbed
by a male Mexican, so Officer Newbold signalled the car to pull
over (T. 116). The driver of the car did not pull over, but
drove on, temporarily losing Officer Newbold (T. 116). When
Officer Newbold was able to stop the vehicle, he ordered the
woman driving the car, which contained only the driver and one
2

other woman, to throw the keys out the car window, and ordered
the two women to place their hands on the ceiling of the car (T.
118).
Officer Newbold explained to the driver of the car, who
was crying, that he was looking for a suspect in an armed
robbery, but when he saw that the occupants of the car were
black, he explained that he was looking for a Mexican and
apologized (T. 119). Upon returning to his car, Officer Newbold
again pulled the car over because he received updated information
from the dispatcher, which indicated that the suspect may have
been black, and identified the vehicle that the suspect had
jumped into (T. 119-120).

The new dispatch information also

indicated that the robber had put the money in a denim bag (T.
119).

Officer Newbold noticed a denim bag in the back seat of

the automobile, and handcuffed the occupants of the car, Rosemary
Mar and Genora Marcellus (T. 120).
Scott Jones was driving in the vicinity of the arrest,
and he saw a person wearing pants and a sweatshirt jump out of a
white compact car, and then saw a police car pull the car over
(T. 106-107).

Mr. Jones drove around the neighborhood following

the person he had seen jump out of the car (T. 107). Mr. Jones
lost sight of the person for about twenty minutes, and spotted
him again, after the person had changed from long pants and a
shirt into shorts (T. 107). Mr. Jones then told Officer Newbold
that he had seen a black male exiting the car prior to the arrest
of the two women (T. 121). Mr. Jones equivocally identified as
3

the perpetrator a person other than Appellant at a line-up (T.
109) .
Ms. Condi and Ms. Lund were driven by a police officer
to the scene of the arrest to identify the automobile that the
robber jumped into (T. 92).
The police retrieved a gun and a bag of money from
children who had found them (T. 99# 104, 137, 140, 143). There
were no legible prints on the gun (T.2 34). Two nylon stockings
were seized from the car occupied by Ms. Marcellus and Ms. Mars,
but the stockings contained no hair samples for the State Crime
Laboratory to compare with Appellant's (T.2 34).
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police
department was called in to interview Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus (T. 148). He stated that after he read Ms. Mar her
Miranda rights, she agreed to speak with him but would not allow
the interview to be tape recorded (T. 149). According to
Detective Edwards, Rosemary said that she and Genora and
Appellant were in the car together at about 3:00 p.m., and that
she and Rosemary went into Payless shoes, but were unable to find
anything they wanted (T. 151). Detective Edwards said that after
the women returned to the car, Appellant went into the shoe
store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he had
just robbed the store (T. 151). The detective said that Rosemary
said that when the police began following their car, she threw
the money and gun out the window, and forced Appellant out of the
car (T. 152).
4

Officer Edwards testified that he then interviewed
Genora Marcellus, again without tape recording the interview at
the witness1 request (T. 153). The detective said that Genora's
version of the events was similar to Ms. Mar's (T. 154).
Neither Rosemary nor Genora testified at trial.
Detective Edwards testified that he interviewed
Appellant on August 22, 1988, the day after the robbery (T. 157).
Officers Carter and Sullivan were present during the interview,
which, he testified, was not recorded at Appellant's request (T.
158).

Officer Edwards stated that Appellant claimed to be

innocent at the beginning of the interview, but that after
Officers Carter and Sullivan were excused (at Appellant's
request), the following transpired:
After the two other officers left the room I
asked him point blank, did you do the
robbery? He said, What's in it for me? I
said, I can't give you any promises.
Everything's going to have to go through the
county attorney's office. He stated, I don't
want Rosemary charged. I says, I still
cannot give you a guarantee. I said, that's
up to the county attorney's office about
that. He stated, Yes, I did it. I said,
will you explain to me how you did it. He
says that they were at his sister's place,
Audrey's on Sunday afternoon. They left the
house in her car. They were going west.
That Rosemary wanted him to do the robbery.
It was his girlfriend. That they went out to
the Payless Shoe on 5600 West 3500 South. He
had the two girls go in to look at the
building, the Payless Shoes, how many girls
were there, where the safe was and the
diagram of the place, more or less, at which
time they came out, then he went in and
robbed them.
He stated he had a shotgun, that he put
the mask over his head. He went in there
with the shotgun. He stated at that time
5

that it wasn't loaded, that he didn't want to
hurt anybody. He said he went in there, had
forced one woman down, he took the other
woman back to the safe and to the till, put
the money in a denim bag and ran out.
He said he got in the car; they took
off. As he went down one of the streets they
said a West Valley officer turned around on
'em; they tried to evade him. He jumped out
at that time.
He says that Rosemary threw the gun and
the money out of the car. He went into the
bushes in a field, did a semi circle and
watched the officers there from across the
street in the weeds.
After the vehicle was impounded and
everybody left he then started to hitchhike.
A gentleman in an older pickup picked him up,
took him up on Redwood Road. He stated that
he was home — well, he was with his sister,
Audrey, at the time when I called Audrey
about 8:00 o'clock on the night before, that
he was at his sister's residence.
(T. 159-160).
Officer Scott Carver testified that he was present when
the interrogation of Appellant began, and stated that after he
and Officer Sullivan left Appellant with Detective Edwards, he
saw Appellant, who told him "I told 'em I did it so they would
let Rosemary go."

(T.2 4 3 ) .
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The trial court violated Appellant's right to due
process under the federal constitution by admitting into evidence
the in court identification of Appellant by the only eyewitness
who testified, Micki Horn.

This in court identification was the

product of the suggestion that Appellant was the perpetrator
provided by Appellant's sitting at the defendant's table at
trial, rather than the product of Ms. Horn's independent
6

recollection of the robbery.

At the robbery, Ms. Horn had

inadequate opportunity to observe the masked robber, and was
under extreme stress.

Her description of him was vague, and she

failed to identify Appellant as the perpetrator in the line-up
she attended.

She also failed to select Appellant from a

photograph of the line-up after she made a definite
identification of Appellant in court.

Ms. Horn's in court

identification of Appellant came months after the robbery, and
months after the pretrial line-up, at which she failed to
identify Appellant.

The trial court's failure to suppress the in

court identification thus violated Appellant's rights to due
process.

Inasmuch as the other evidence linking Appellant to the

crime was inadmissible and/or weak, the court's admission of the
in court identification was prejudicial error.
The trial court violated Appellant's rights to
Confrontation under the Utah and federal constitution by
admitting the hearsay statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus.

The court abused its discretion in finding these

witnesses unavailable, in the absence of the state's proof that a
good faith effort had been made to find each witness.
Furthermore, the court erred in admitting the statements into
evidence as statements against penal interest, because the
statements, as confessions of accomplices, should have been
presumed unreliable.

Although the statements interlocked with

Appellant's alleged confession, the circumstances surrounding the
State's obtaining the statements from Appellant, Ms. Mar and Ms.
7

Marcellus preclude a finding that the hearsay statements were
reliable.

This violation of Appellant's rights to confrontation

was prejudicial error because of the interlocking nature of the
confessions, and because of the paucity of other evidence
supporting Appellant's conviction.
The trial court violated Appellant's rights provided in
the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions
by imposing a firearm enhancement, because Appellant's sentence
for aggravated robbery was already elevated to account for the
use of a firearm.
I.
IN FAILING TO SUPPRESS THE
IN COURT IDENTIFICATION OF APPELLANT,
THE COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
Ms. Horn, who was working at the Payless Store during
the robbery testified that she got a good look at the masked
robber (T. 55). On September 29, 1988, she attended a line-up in
which Appellant was included, at which time she equivocally
identified a person other than Appellant as the perpetrator (T.
56).

Over objection, the court allowed Ms. Horn to identify

Appellant in court, stating the conditions to testimony, without
investigating them further: "If she has any independent
recollection she can testify to it." (T. 57). Ms. Horn made this
in-court identification of Appellant:
Well, when I walked in I sat down and he
turned around and it hit me like a ton of
bricks. I recognized him. And that was it.
And everything about him — the features — I
just ... it was him. I just couldn't — I
don't know. But I recognized him. The way
he moved, the way his back was over, the
8

wrinkles on the forehead, his nose,
everything.
(T. 57-58).

When Ms. Horn was then shown a photograph of the

line-up she attended, she identified a different person in the
line-up as Appellant (T. 66-67).

Ms. Horn was the only witness

who made an eyewitness identification of Appellant as the
perpetrator of the robbery.
This in court identification was a product of the fact
that Appellant was the person sitting in the defendant's chair at
trial, and was not the product of Ms. Horn's independent
recollection of the identification of the robber from the
robbery.

"Under the totality of the circumstances, [the

identification] was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification" that it denied Appellant a
fair trial.

The factors to be used in evaluating this due

process 1 claim are provided in State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353
(Utah 1980):
In determining the reliability of the
identification under the totality of the
circumstances, the court must also consider
the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, the
witness's degree of attention, the accuracy
of any prior description of the criminal, the
level of certainty demonstrated during the
identification procedure, and the time
between the crime and the identification.

1
The fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution provides "nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
9

Id. at 357, citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)/
A. Opportunity to View Assailant
Micki Horn testified that on August 21, 1988, the
Assailant, who was wearing two nylons on his head and pointing a
sawed-off shotgun at her, approached her from behind, grabbed her
arm and dragged her to a counter, demanding money (T. 52). Ms.
Horn testified that her nervousness made it difficult for her to
operate the cash register (T. 52-53).

The robber reportedly

threatened to "cut her in half" if she set off the alarm when she
was getting the money out of the register (T. 53), and it was at
this time that Ms. Horn claimed to have gotten a good look at him
(T. 55). As soon as the robber received the money, more
customers came into the store, and the robber ordered Ms. Horn to
get rid of them, at which time he left the store (T. 55, 58).
Ms. Horn and Appellant were apparently of different racial
backgrounds (R. 98).
In short, Ms. Horn had limited opportunity to view the
assailant.

£f. State v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed June 22, 1989

(Utah), slip opinion at 5 and 6 (victim saw unmasked assailant
and recognized him as someone who had dated her next door
neighbor); State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah
2
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court
criticized the factors listed in Neil v. Biggers as "based on
assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and
essentially unchallenged empirical studies." Long at 491.
Following this criticism, the factors listed in Neil v. Biggers
were relied on by the Utah Supreme Court in its recent case of
State v. Thamer, No. 870078 (filed June 22, 1989). Appellant
will apply the Neil v. Biggers test, and will point out when the
Long criticisms of that test are pertinent.
10

1980)(victim viewed assailant for a short period of time in the
dark after victim had just awakened); State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483, 487, 489 (Utah 1986)(indicating that the victim viewed
assailant's face for six seconds and viewed his back for thirty
seconds in the dark, and noting "the well documented fact that
identifications tend to be more accurate where the person
observing and the one being observed are of the same race");
Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977)(witness spoke with
defendant for two or three minutes, viewing him in the light).
B. Degree of Attention
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court
noted, "Another limitation which can affect perception is the
emotional state of the observer.

Contrary to much accepted lore,

when an observer is experiencing a marked degree of stress,
perceptual abilities are known to decrease significantly."

Id.

at 489 (citation omitted).
Ms. Horn's testimony indicates no time lag between the
events of the robbery - certainly in being accosted by a masked
man pointing a sawed-off shotgun at her and dragging her to get
money, Ms. Horn must have been under considerable stress.

The

entrance of the customers and the activities of her co-worker,
Julie Lund, could only have distracted Ms. Horn further from
perceiving the robber's appearance.

She indicated that she got

her good look at the robber when he threatened to "cut her in
half", while she was fumbling with the cash register.

In these

circumstances, Ms. Horn's degree of attention was insufficient
11

to provide an independent basis for the in court identification.
Cf. State v. Thamer, slip opinion at 6 (victim was with the
assailant from sixty to ninety minutes, saw his unmasked face,
and recognized him and his manner of speech from prior
occurrences); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)(victim
viewed assailant as victim was shot and blown against a wall, and
as victim returned fire); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115
(1977)(witness was police officer, trained to make detailed
observations, and aware that his observations would be subject to
scrutiny later in the prosecution).
C. Accuracy of Description
Ms. Horn's description on the day of the robbery of
the robber was vague - she told the police that the assailant had
dark skin and dark hair, was possibly Hispanic, and she described
his build and clothing to them (T. 64). Her failure to identify
Appellant, who is black, at the subsequent line-up, and to
identify him in the photograph of the lineup underscores the
vagary of her perception of Appellant.

Cf. State v. Long, 721

P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986)("Further, Rocha failed to identify
defendant from a six-photo array presented to him three days
after the shooting...Rocha identified Long at trial and at two
preliminary hearings; however, the record indicates that these
identifications took place not in formal lineups, but in
courtroom proceedings during which Long was apparently the only
black man present."); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 115
(1977)(witness provided description of race, height, build, color
12

and style of hair, facial bone structure, and clothing).
D. Level of Certainty
Inasmuch as Ms. Horn indicated that her in court
identification of Appellant as the perpetrator hit her "like a
ton of bricks" (T. 57-58), it is safe to say that her level of
certainty in making the identification was high.

However, her

identification of the wrong person as Appellant in the line-up
photograph seemed equally certain until she learned that she had
identified the wrong person as Appellant (T. 66, 71). Cif. State
v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed June 22, 1989 (Utah), slip opinion
at 6 (witness1 equivocation in identifying the perpetrator was
minimal, she consistently identified him throughout the
proceedings).
It should also be noted that in State v. Long, 721 P.2d
483 (Utah 1986), the court indicated that "[r]esearch has also
undermined the common notion that the confidence with which an
individual makes an identification is a valid indicator of the
accuracy of the recollection.

In fact, the accuracy of an

identification is, at times, inversely related to the confidence
with which it is made."

IxU at 490 (citations omitted).

E. Passage of Time and Confrontation
In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986), the court
explained the dangers to accurate identification posed by the
passage of time between the crime and the identification.
court stated:
The memory process is also subject to
distortion in the second or retention stage,
13

The

when information that may or may not have
been accurately perceived is stored in the
memory. Research demonstrates that both the
length of time between the witness's
experience and the recollection of tliat
experience, and the occurrence of other
events in the intervening time period, affect
the accuracy and completeness of recall.
Just as in the perception stage, where the
mind infers what occurred from what was
selected for perception, in the retention
stage people tend to add extraneous details
and to fill in memory gaps over time, thereby
unconsciously constructing more detailed,
logical, and coherent recollections of their
actual experiences. Thus, as eyewitnesses
wend their way through the criminal justice
process, their reports of what was seen and
heard tend to become "more accurate, more
complete and less ambiguous" in appearance.
The implications of this mental strategy for
any criminal defendant whose conviction
hinges on an eyewitness identification are
obvious.
Id. at 489-490 (citation omitted).
The robbery occurred on August 21, 1988.

The first

line-up Ms. Horn attended, at which she did not identify
Appellant as her assailant, was held on September 29th, 1988 (T.
55-56).

Her in court identification occurred on January 11, 1989

(T. 57-58).
This passage of time and Ms. Horn's

failure to

identify Appellant as the perpetrator and as himself in the lineup photograph demonstrate that the in court identification was
not the product of her memory of the robbery, which occurred
almost five months prior.

Cjf. State v. Thamer, No. 870078, filed

June 22, 1989 (Utah), slip opinion at 6 (victim identified
perpetrator seven weeks after the attack, and her identification
of him was consistent); Manson v. Braithwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 11514

116 (1977)(witness described perpetrator within minutes of the
crime, and identified him two days later).
F. THE ADMISSION OF THE IDENTIFICATION WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
In Long, the court set forth lengthy requirements and
rationales behind providing jurors with adequate information in
jury instructions to ferret out unreliable eyewitness
identifications.

While such an instruction was given in this

case (See R. 97-100), Appellant asserts that the law of Utah has
already recognized that such instructions, and even very
effective cross-examinations of eyewitnesses do not overcome
jurors1 tendency to believe eyewitnesses.

See Long 721 P.2d 483,

490-492, and n.5 (recognizing juror tendency to believe
eyewitness identification, without regard to cross-examination of
eyewitnesses and cautionary instructions.).
The eyewitness identification was crucial to the
instant case.

The only other evidence tying Appellant to the

crime was his confession, which the jurors might have discounted
as his effort to protect his girlfriend, or as never having been
made, and the unreliable confessions of Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus, which were not properly admitted into evidence (see
Point II of this brief).
Defense counsel informed the court during the
suppression hearing prior to trial that Appellant was not
identified in pretrial line-ups (S.H. 3 ) , and the court knew of
Ms. Horn's equivocations about the perpetrator's identity prior
to admitting her in court identification (T. 57). Nonetheless,
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the court assumed that the in court identification was the
product of Ms. Horn's independent recollection of the robbery,
and admitted it into evidence.

Rather than relying on a curative

instruction, the court should have recognized that the in court
identification was not reliable and highly prejudicial.

The

court's callous disregard of Appellant's right to due process
should be reversed by this Court.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED
APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION
AND UTAH RULE OF EVIDENCE 802
BY ADMITTING THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF
ROSEMARY MAR AND GENORA MARCELLUS.
As noted in the statement of facts, Officer Edwards
testified that he took statements from Rosemary Mar and Genora
Marcellus to the effect that Appellant robbed the Payless Store
(T. 148-154).

On January 11, 1989, Appellant moved to suppress

the statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus.

The

transcript of the hearing on this motion will hereinafter be
referred to by the initials "S.H."

The court admitted the

statements of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus over objection as
"statements against interest" after finding the witnesses
unavailable under Utah Rule of Evidence 804 (T. 48, S.H. 43-44).
When Detective Edwards began testifying about the interview with
Ms. Mar, the court interrupted, explaining to the jurors as
follows:
Obviously the testimony that he is
referring to as to that which she said is
hearsay. Prior to this hearing the court has
ruled, however, the unavailability of those
witnesses — there was appropriate effort,
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the court has found, by the law enforcement
agencies to locate those witnesses which
make it possible that the officer may testify
and you may [ac]cept that as though that
witness were testifying.
(T. 150).
The court, in effect telling the jurors to accept as
fact Detective Edward's claims that the confessions were made,
constituted a misstatement of the law3 and improper comment on
the evidence.

This bolstering of the hearsay statements by the

court exacerbated the violation of Appellant's rights to
confrontation, discussed infra.
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
provides the accused with the right "to be confronted with the
witnesses against him."

Article I section 12 of the Utah

Constitution provides the same protection.

State v. Brooks, 638

P.2d 537, 539 (Utah 1981)(Article I section 12 of the Utah
Constitution is construed the same as the federal counterpart).
In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965), the
3
There is no rule of law that translates the
unavailability of a hearsay declarant into automatic credibility
of the witness relaying the hearsay declarant's statements.
4
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 provides "The court
shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court
states any of the evidence, it must instruct the jurors that
they are the exclusive judges of all questions of fact." See
State v. Sanders, 496 P.2d 270, 275 (Utah 1972)("[T]his does not
prevent the trial court from including in his instructions
general statements concerning certain types of evidence, nor
concerning the burdens of proof and the sometimes varying degrees
of proof required. But it does enjoin him from commenting on the
quality or credibility of the evidence in such a way as to
indicate that he favors the claims or the position of either
party.").
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prosecutor read the contents of a separately-tried co5
defendant's confession into evidence during Douglas1 trial, and
police officers testified that he (Loyd) had made the confession,
but Loyd claimed his privilege not to incriminate himself, and
refused to testify•

_Id. at 416-417.

The Court held that the

admission of Loyd's confession violated Douglas' right to
confront the witnesses against him, explaining:
Loyd's alleged statement that the petitioner
fired the shotgun constituted the only direct
evidence that he had done so; coupled with
the description of the circumstances
surrounding the shooting, this formed a
crucial link in the proof both of
petitioner's act and of the requisite intent
to murder.... Nor was the opportunity to
cross-examine the law enforcement officers
adequate to redress this denial of the
essential right secured by the Confrontation
Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the
danger that the jury would treat the
Solicitor's questioning of Loyd and Loyd's
refusal to answer as proving the truth of
Loyd's alleged confession. But since their
evidence tended to show only that Loyd made
the confession, cross-examination of them as
to its genuineness could not substitute for
cross-examination of Loyd to test the truth
of the statement itself.
Id. at 419.
In the instant case, Officer Edwards was able to relay
his version of the testimony of Rosemary Mar and Genora Marcellus
"as if they were testifying" (T. 150), but Appellant was never
5
Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were apparently never
prosecuted, although they were arrested for the robbery, and
their statements were taken on the night of the robbery and their
arrests.
Appellant relies on cases involving hearsay statements
of unindicted accomplices and co-defendants, because the analysis
present in those cases is not contingent on whether or not the
declarant was actually charged with the crime.
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given the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Mar or Ms. Marcellus.
Appellant's opportunity to cross-examine Officer Edwards was no
substitute for Appellant's rights to confrontation of Ms. Mar
and Ms. Marcellus, and in admitting their testimony through
hearsay, the trial court violated Appellant's rights to
confrontation under the Utah and federal constitutions.
In Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court
interpreted the Confrontation Clause as demanding a two part
showing prior to the admission of hearsay statements of a nontestifying witness:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not
present for cross-examination at trial, the
Confrontation Clause normally requires a
showing that he is unavailable. Even then,
his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability."
Reliability can be inferred without more in a
case where the evidence falls within a
firmly rooted hearsay exception.
In other
cases, the evidence must be excluded, at
least absent a showing of particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness.

6
The trial court's admission of the statements of Ms.
Mars and Ms. Marcellus as "statements against interest" does not
satisfy the confrontation clause. Inasmuch as both Ms. Mar and
Ms. Marcellus disclaimed any personal responsibility for the
robbery, the court's characterization of their statements as
being "against their penal interest" under Utah Rule of Evidence
804(b)(3) is questionable.
Regardless of the admissibility of
the statements under well-recognized exceptions to the hearsay
rule, because they are statements of accomplices, they are
presumed unreliable. See Lee v* Illinois, at 538-541, 544 n.5
(explaining the presumed unreliability of accomplice statements,
and stating "We reject respondent's categorization of the hearsay
involved in this case as a simple 'declaration against penal
interest.' That concept defines too large a class for meaningful
Confrontation Clause analysis. We decide this case as involving
a confession by an accomplice which incriminates a criminal
defendant.").
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Id. at 66. As will be demonstrated, infra, the prosecution in
this case never carried the burden in admitting the hearsay
statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Genora, and the admission of this
testimony violated Appellant's rights to confrontation.
A. THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT SHOWING OF WITNESS UNAVAILABILITY.
In Roberts, the Court explained that in seeking to
admit hearsay statements of non-testifying witnesses, it is the
prosecution's burden of proof to show a good-faith effort in
obtaining the witnesses for testimony in court.

Roberts, 448

U.S. 56, 74-75.
Officer Edwards testified that he had been unable to
find Ms. Mar at her home address, and that he had recently
discovered that she had been going by an assumed name (S.H. 40).
He testified that he had talked with an investigator from the
county attorney's office, but was unable to find Ms. Mar (S.H.
40).
Officer Edwards testified that he called Ms. Marcellus'
home, and that Ms. Marcellus' mother indicated that Ms. Marcellus
had received the subpoena and would obey it (S.H. 39-40).

While

Ms. Marcellus disobeyed the subpoenas for the preliminary hearing
and the trial, the prosecution never presented any proof that any
officers of the State made any efforts to obtain her presence
other than mailing the subpoenas and making the one phone call to
her mother.
Officer Edwards contacted Appellant's sister, Audrey,
who owned the car which Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were driving
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the day of the robbery, but he never inquired as to the
whereabouts of Ms. Mar, who Audrey testified was in Indianapolis
(T.2 47, 51-52).
The prosecutor indicated that he had mailed subpoenas
to Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus twice, and that the Mar subpoenas
were sent to the same address twice, and returned both times
because of improper address (S.H. 41-42).

While he stated that

he didn't expect either witness to obey the subpoenas and that
they had disobeyed them in the past (T. 34-35), the prosecution
made no indication that contempt proceedings allowed by Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 14 were carried through, or that any other
attempt to enforce the subpoenas was made.
The fact that the prosecution in this case failed to
make a good faith effort to locate these witnesses is
demonstrated by comparing this case with Roberts.

There, the

Court found that the prosecution had met the burden of proving a
good faith effort to obtain the witnesses at trial because,
despite the prosecution's subpoenaing the witness five times, and
voir diring her parents as to her whereabouts, the non-testifying
witness could not be found by her own family, who had tried to
7
reach her, by her friend, or by the prosecution. Id_. at 75.
7 Also compare the facts of this case with State v. Case,
752 P.2d 356, 357-358 (Utah App. 1987)(trial court violated
defendant's right to confrontation by admitting tape recording of
victim's preliminary hearing testimony at trial; while
prosecution maintained close contact with the witness, the
prosecution failed to use the Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal
Proceedings, when on notice that the witness might not attend the
trial), dicta concerning reliability of former testimony
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The prosecution in this case apparently gave up the
effort to obtain Ms. Mar's presence at trial after mailing two
subpoenas to the wrong address, and apparently gave up the effort
to obtain Ms. Marcellus1

presence at trial after mailing

subpoenas to the right address, and after Ms. Marcellus failed to
comport with her mother's indication that she would obey the
subpoenas.

There was no evidence presented of any attempts to

enforce the subpoenas.
The State may have made a showing that obtaining the
witnesses for in-court testimony was inconvenient.

However, it

failed to show a good faith effort to obtain the witnesses.
Thus, the admission of the hearsay statements violated
Appellant's rights to confrontation under the Utah and federal
constitutions.
B. THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS WERE UNRELIABLE.
Detective Ron Edwards of the West Valley Police
department was called on August 21, 1988, to interview Rosemary
Mar and Genora Marcellus (T. 148), after he had received details

overruled 758 P.2d 909, 914 (Utah 1988); State v* Chapman, 655
P.2d 1119, 1122-1123 (state may not ignore statutory remedies
when the state has notice that witness intends not to appear at
trial); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 210-216 (non-testifying
witness residing in Sweden was unavailable because prosecution
had no power to compel his attendance, and prior crossexamination of witness provided indicia of reliability satisfying
the Confrontation Clause), and with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719,
723-726 (1968)(prosecution failed to prove unavailability of
incarcerated witness, who was subject to subpoena power).
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of the robbery from the victims (S.H. 15).8

He stated that after

he read Ms. Mar her Miranda rights, she agreed to speak with him
but would not allow the interview to be tape recorded (T. 149).
According to Detective Edwards, Rosemary said that she and Genora
and Appellant were in the car together at about 3:00 p.m., and
that she and Rosemary went into Payless shoes, but were unable to
find anything they wanted (T. 151). Detective Edwards said that
after the women returned to the car, Appellant went into the shoe
store, returning a few minutes later to inform them that he had
just robbed the store (T. 151). The detective said that Rosemary
said that when the police began following their car, she threw
the money and gun out the window, and forced Appellant out of the
car (T. 152).
Officer Edwards testified that he then interviewed
Genora Marcellus, again without tape recording the interview at
the witness' request (T. 153). The detective said that Genora's
version of the events was similar to Ms. Mar's (T. 154), but that
Ms. Marcellus said that she pulled into a Seven-Eleven across the
street from the Payless shoe store, and that Appellant then went
and robbed the store (T. 154). Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus both
denied any foreknowledge that the robbery would occur (S.H. 14,
34).
8
While S.H. 15 is somewhat ambiguous as to the sequence
of Officer Edward's contact with the victims and Ms. Mar and Ms.
Marcellus, it is clear that Officer Edwards was briefed on the
facts of the case by Officer Newbold, one of the arresting
officers who had spoken to the victims and participated in the
investigation, prior to interviewing Ms. Mars and Ms. Marcellus
(T. 148).
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Officer Edwards interviewed Appellant at 8:00 p.m. on
August 22, 1988 (S.H. 10, 11). The officer testified that the
interview was not recorded and Appellant confessed to the robbery
after two other officers were excused from the examination room,
leaving Officer Edwards and Appellant alone (S.H. 12-13).
Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he did not
confess to the crime (S.H. 21).
The testimony of accomplices is presumed unreliable.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), where the Court
found that Bruton1s right to confrontation was violated by the
admission of a hearsay confession of a non-testifying codefendant, the court explained the lack of reliability of
statements of accomplices:
Not only are the incriminations devastating
to the defendant but their credibility is
inevitcibly suspect, a fact recognized when
accomplices do take the stand and the jury is
instructed to weigh their testimony carefully
given the recognized motivation to shift
blame to others. The unreliability of such
evidence is intolerably compounded when the
alleged accomplice, as here, does not testify
and cannot be tested by cross-examination.
It was against such threats to a fair trial
that the Confrontation Clause was directed.
Id. 135-136.
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530 (1986), Lee was
convicted, in a joint trial with a co-defendant, Thomas, of
killing her Aunt Beedie.

In the bench trial, the court relied on

parts of Thomas' confession in convicting Lee.

IcU at 531.

Thomas' confession was obtained after Lee had already confessed
and after she asked Thomas to accept part of the responsibility
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for the murder of Lee's Aunt Beedie and Odessa Harris.

JEd. at

533.
Lee's statement indicated that there was some
longstanding discomfort between Lee and Thomas and the victims,
that Thomas stabbed Odessa after slight verbal provocation, that
Aunt Beedie had threatened and tried to kill Lee# and that Lee
then stabbed Aunt Beedie.

Id^. at 533-534.

Thomas' statement was similar to Lee's but indicated a
premeditated plan of Lee's and Thomas' to kill the two victims,
and indicated that it was Lee, and not Thomas, who decided to
kill the victims that night.

IcJ. at 535.

The prosecutor apparently confused which statements
were made by which defendants in argument to the court, and
relied on Thomas' confession to convict Lee.

Id_. at 537.

The

court explicitly relied on information gleaned from Thomas'
confession in convicting Lee, and the Supreme Court found that
this violated the Confrontation Clause of the federal
constitution:
We need not address the question of Thomas'
availability, for we hold that Thomas'
statement, as the confession of an
accomplice, was presumptively unreliable and
that it did not bear sufficient independent
"indicia of reliability" to overcome that
presumption.
Id. at 538-539.

The Court elaborated on the lack of reliability

of accomplice testimony:
Our cases recognize that the
truthfinding function of the Confrontation
Clause is uniquely threatened when an
accomplice's confession is sought to be
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introduced against a criminal defendant
without the benefit of cross-examination. As
has been noted, such a confession "is
hearsay, subject to all the dangers of
inaccuracy which characterize hearsay
generally. . . . More than this, however, the
arrest statements of a codefendant have
traditionally been viewed with special
suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to
implicate the defendant and to exonerate
•himself, a codefendant's statements about
what the defendant said or did are less
credible than ordinary hearsay evidence."
Id. at 541 (citations omitted).
The Court also rejected the argument that because the
confessions "interlocked", they were reliable.

The Court

stated:
Obviously, when codefendants1 confessions are
identical in all material respects, the
likelihood that they are accurate is
significantly increased. But a confession is
not necessarily rendered reliable simply
because some of the facts it contains
"interlock" with the facts in the defendant's
statement. The true danger inherent in this
type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective
reliability. As we have consistently
recognized, a codefendant's confession is
presumptively unreliable as to the passages
detailing the defendant's conduct or
culpability because those passages may well
be the product of the codefendant's desire to
shift or spread the blame, curry favor,
avenge himself, or divert attention to
another. If those portions of the
codefendant's purportedly "interlocking"
statement which bear to any significant
degree on the defendant's participation in
the crime are not thoroughly substantiated by
the defendant's own confession, the admission
of the statement poses too serious a threat
to the accuracy of the verdict to be
countenanced by the Sixth Amendment. In
other words, when the discrepancies between
the statements are not insignificant, the
codefendant's confession may not be admitted.

26

Id. at 545.
In the instant case, the State may argue that the
presumption of unreliability applicable to the confessions of Ms.
Mar, Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant is rebutted by the fact that
the accomplice confessions "interlock".

There are three areas of

incongruity among the three confessions: Ms. Mar's and Ms.
Marcullus' foreknowledge of the robbery, Ms. Mar's and Ms.
Marcellus' participation in casing the store prior to the
robbery, and the identity of the person who wanted the robbery
committed.
Before concluding that these incongruities are
insignificant and that the "interlock" of the three confessions
therefore justifies their admission under the Confrontation
Clause, however, this Court must recognize that the statements
were all allegedly taken by one officer, who did not record the
statements, and who knew the details of the crime prior to
conducting the interviews.

Appellant testified at the

suppression hearing that his confession never occurred, and Ms.
Mar and Ms. Marcellus never testified.

This factor dissipates
9
further the reliability of the confessions.

9 See Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 419 (1965)("Nor was
the opportunity to cross-examine the law enforcement officers
adequate to redress this denial of the essential right secured by
the Confrontation Clause. Indeed, their testimony enhanced the
danger that the jury would treat the Solicitor's questioning of
Loyd and Loyd's refusal to answer as proving the truth of Loyd's
alleged confession. But since their evidence tended to show only
that Loyd made the confession, cross-examination of them as to
its genuineness could not substitute for cross-examination of
Loyd to test the truth of the statement itself.").
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In the Lee Court's rejection of the state's efforts to
rebut the presumption of the unreliability of Thomas1
confession, the Court cited various factors which parallel those
in the instant case.

The Court discussed the circumstances under

which Thomas' confession was obtained:
When Thomas was taken in for questioning and
read his rights he refused to talk to the
police. The confession was elicited only
after Thomas was told that Lee had already
implicated him and only after he was implored
by Lee to share "the rap" with her. The
unsworn statement was given in response to
the questions of police, who, having already
interrogated Lee, no doubt knew what they
were looking for, and the statement was not
tested in any manner by contemporaneous
cross-examination by counsel, or its
equivalent. Although, as the State points
out, the confession was found to be voluntary
for Fifth Amendment purposes, such a finding
does not bear on the question of whether the
confession was also free from any desire,
motive, or impulse Thomas may have had either
to mitigate the appearance of his own
culpability by spreading the blame or to
overstcite Lee' s involvement in retaliation
for her having implicated him in the murders.
Id. at 544.
In the instant case, Ms. Mar, Ms. Marcellus, and
Appellant

were all supposedly interviewed after Officer Edwards

had interviewed the victims of the robbery.
Edwards knew what he was looking for.

Thus, Officer

Appellant's confession

10
While Lee's discussion of the reliability of the
confession focuses solely on the reliability of the confession of
the co-defendant, Thomas, Appellant asserts that the reliability
of his own confession must also be proved before any finding of
reliability of the confessions is inferred from the
"interlocking" between the confessions of Appellant and his
accomplices.
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supposedly followed Officer Edward's informing Appellant that
Rosemary had already confessed.

Not only was there no protection

of cross-examination to test the credibility of the confessions,
but also there was no recording of any interview with which to
test the accuracy of the content of the confessions.il

Ms. Mar,

Ms. Marcellus, and Appellant all attributed responsibility for
the robbery to someone other than themselves.

In this case, as

in Lee, the "interlock" between the three confessions failed to
overcome the presumption that confessions of accomplices are too
unreliable to admit through hearsay, and the trial court's
admission of the confessions violated Appellant's right to
confrontation.
C. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS VIOLATED UTAH RULE OF
EVIDENCE 802.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801 defines hearsay as "a
statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth
of the matter asserted."

Utah Rule of Evidence 802 prohibits the

admission of hearsay.
The statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus were made
out of court, and were submitted as substantive evidence of
Appellant's guilt ("offered to prove the truth of the matter
asserted").

In admitting this hearsay, the trial court purported

11 See Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 192
(1987)(reliability of petitioner's confession was dissipated by
its transmission through the person who witnessed it and
testified about it in court, as compared to the better
reliability of the videotaped confession of accomplice).
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to act under Utah Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which provides as
follows:
A statement which was at the time of its
making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant
to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
Neither Ms. Marcellus nor Ms. Mar claimed
responsibility for the robbery in their statements to Detective
Edwards.

In fact, they both claimed that they were unaware that

the robbery would occur until after it already did (T. 151, 154,
S.H. 14, 34). The statements of accomplices are traditionally
considered to be exculpatory of the declarants, Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530, 545 (1986), and in this case, there was no
foundational showing that either of the witnesses believed that
their statements would subject them to criminal liability.
Thus, the trial court's reliance on the "statement
against penal interest" exception was misplaced, and in admitting
the statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus, the trial court
violated Utah Rule of Evidence 802.
D. THE ADMISSION OF THE HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF MS. MAR AND MS.
MARCELLUS WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR.
In order to overcome the trial court's violation of
Appellant's federal right to confrontation, the State must
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demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987).

Particularly when the statements of Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus are
viewed in light of the trial court's improper comment that the
jurors should accept Officer Edwards' account of the statements
as accurate, the State cannot meet this burden of proof.
In Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979), a plurality
opinion, the Court addressed the admissibility under the
Confrontation Clause of confessions of co-defendants which
interlock with a confession of the defendant on trial, as long as
jurors are instructed to consider each confession solely as it
relates to the declarant.

Three members of the Court reasoned

that the admission of the confessions of the co-defendants were
not excluded under Bruton or the Confrontation Clause because the
defendant's own confession interlocks with those of his codefendants, proving his guilt, and corroborating the reliability
of the co-defendant's statements, rendering the benefits to be
gained through cross-examination and confrontation unnecessary.
Id. at 72-73.
The plurality opinion in Parker v. Randolph was
rejected by a majority of the Court in Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S.
186 (1987).

There, the petitioner was convicted of murder, in

part with a videotaped confession of a co-defendant which
interlocked with a confession allegedly made by the petitioner to
a third person who quoted it at the petitioner's trial.
court explained the prejudice leveled by the admission of
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The

interlocking confessions:
In fact, it seems to us that
"interlocking" bears a positively inverse
relationship to devastation. A codefendant*s
confession will be relatively harmless if the
incriminating story it tells is different
from that which the defendant himself is
alleged to have told, but enormously damaging
if it confirms, in all essential respects,
the defendant's alleged confession. It might
be otherwise if the defendant were standing
by his confession, in which case it could be
said that the codefendant's confession does
no more than support the defendant's very own
case. But in the real world of criminal
litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid
his confession - on the ground that it was
not accurately reported, or that it was not
really true when made. In the present case,
for example, the petitioner sought to
establish that [the witness relaying the
petitioner's alleged confession] had a motive
for falsely reporting a confession that never
in fact occurred. In such circumstances a
codefendant's confession that corroborates
the defendant's confession significantly
harms the defendant's case, whereas one that
is positively incompatible gives credence to
the defendant's assertion that the alleged
confession was nonexistent or false.
Id. at 192.
In this case, the confessions of Ms. Mar, Ms.
Marcellus, and Appellant were the only evidence of Appellant's
participation in the robbery (aside from the in court
identification by the victim, Micki Horn, which should have been
suppressed).

The confessions in this case interlocked to a great

degree, and must have added credence to the confession that
Officer Edwards testified Appellant made to him.

In the absence

of the admission of the statements Ms. Mar and Ms. Marcellus
allegedly made to Officer Edwards, the jurors might have
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discounted Appellant's alleged confession as fiction authored by
Officer Edwards, or as Appellant's effort to protect his
girlfriend# Rosemary Mar.

The admission of the hearsay

statements constituted prejudicial error.
III.
APPELLANT'S SENTENCE WAS IMPROPERLY
ENHANCED TWICE FOR THE USE OF A FIREARM.
Appellant was convicted of aggravated robbery and was
also given an additional five year sentence, pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. section 76-3-203/ for use of a firearm during the
commission of a felony (R. 114-115).
The robbery for which Appellant was convicted was
classified as an "aggravated robbery"/ a first degree felony,
12
because the robber used a firearm in the course of the robbery.
While the Utah State Legislature has provided for extra
punishment for the use of firearms and other dangerous weapons in

12 At the time Appellant was tried, Utah Code Ann. section
76-6-302 provided
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of
the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
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all felonies,

the trial court erred in applying this general

enhancement during Appellant's sentencing because the use of the
firearm was already factored into Appellant's sentence by the
elevation of the robbery for which Appellant was convicted to an
aggravated first degree felony robbery.

This double enhancement

of Appellant's sentence is not supported by the applicable
statutes, and violated Appellant's rights under the Double
Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and United States Constitutions.
A. Legislative Intent.
In Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978), the
appellants had been convicted of bank robberies committed with
firearms, and were sentenced to serve enhanced terms under both

13

Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203 provides
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of
the first degree, for a term at not
less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by
law, and which may be for life but
if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was
used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the
court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may
additionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not
concurrently...
34

the statute defining the elements of the robbery/ 4
federal firearm enhancement statute.15

and under a

The Court determined that

14 18 U.S.C. sections 2113(a) and (d) provided:
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or
by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any
property or money or any other thing of value
belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, or any building used in whole or
in part as a bank, credit union, or in such
savings and loan association, or building, or
part thereof, so used, any felony affecting
such bank, credit union, or such savings and
loan association and in violation of any
statute of the United States, or any larceny
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.
«...

(d) Whoever, in committing, or in
attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the
life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty-five years, or both.
Simpson, 435 U.S. 6, 7 n.l.
15

18 U.S.C. section 924(c) provided:
(c) Whoever —
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during
the commission of any felony for which he may
be prosecuted in a court of the United
sTates, "shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for the commission of such felony,
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
not less than one year not more than ten
years. In the case of his second or
35

enhancing the appellants' sentences under both statutes was
improper because the legislature did not intend the double
enhancement.

The Court's rationale was tripartite.

First, the Court noted that the overall legislative
history of the statute, and the sponsor of the enhancement
statute during the introduction of the legislation indicated that
the enhancement was not intended to apply to crimes which account
for the use of a firearm.

I<3. at 13, 14.1 f\

Second, the Court noted that interpreting the statutes
as allowing double enhancement would "violate the established
rule of construction that * ambiguity concerning the ambit of
subsequent conviction under this subsection,
such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than two nor more
than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the court shall
not suspend the sentence in the case of a
second or subsequent conviction of such
person or give him a probationary sentence,
nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this subsection run concurrently with
any term of imprisonment imposed for the
commission of such felony.
Simpson at 8, n.2.
16
The Utah legislative debates concerning the firearm
enhancement statute reflect legislative intent to stave off the
enactment of gun control laws effecting sportsmen by enacting
laws against illegal use of firearms, and to deter criminals from
using firearms. There is no discussion indicating that the
legislature intended for the firearm enhancement to be applied in
circumstances such as aggravated robbery, in which use of a
firearm is an element of the crime charged. Legislative Budget
Session 1/13/76, discussion of House Bill 3, second day, disc 2
side 1, selections 9-13; General Session 2/28/77, discussion of
Substitute House Bill 323, disc 1 (numbered 181), side 1,
selections 21-30, side 2, selections 13-30, disc 2 (numbered
182), side 1, selections 0-3.
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criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.'"
Simpson at 14, 15, quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336,
347 (1971). 17
Third, the Court found the firearm enhancement in the
statute defining the robbery should apply, by virtue of the
principle that "where a general statute and a specific statute
speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was
enacted later," the specific statute takes precedence.

IcU at

is."
Because there is no expression of legislative intent to
impose double enhancement for use of a firearm in an aggravated
robbery, and because basic standards of statutory construction
do not allow double enhancement to be presumed into practice, the
trial court erred in enhancing Appellant's sentence tv/ice for the
use of a firearm.
B* Double Jeopardy
The Simpson Court noted that the Double Jeopardy
Clause, which prohibits "multiple punishments for the same
offense",

might be offended in cases such as the instant one,

in which the government is able to prove the violation of two
separate statutes with one set of facts.

Simpson at 11, n.5,

17
Accord State v. Egbert, 748 P.2d 558, 562 (Utah
1987)(Durham, J. dissenting)("It is well established that
ambiguities in criminal statutes must be resolved in favor of lenity.").
18
19
1987).

Accord Cannon v. Gardner, 611 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Utah 1980).
Accord State v. Miller, 747 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah App.
37

quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).

The Court

stated the test for the possible violation of the Double Jeopardy
Clause:
"[t]he applicable rule is that where the same
act or transaction constitutes a violation of
two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether there are
two offenses or only one, is whether each
provision requires proof of a fact which the
other does not."
Id* at 11, quoting Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
304 (1932).
In State v. Sosa, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), the
Appellant argued that his convictions under Utah Code Ann.
section 76-10-505,2 0 and Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1) ,21
20

Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-505 provided as follows
Every person who carries a loaded
firearm in a vehicle or on any public street
in an incorporated city or in a prohibited
area of an unincorporated territory within
this state is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.

Sosa at 345.
21
follows:

Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1) provided as
Any person who is not a citizen of the
United States, or any person who has been
convicted of any crime of violence under the
laws of the United States, the state of Utah,
or any other state, government, or country, .
. . shall not own or have in his possession
or under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon as defined in this part. .Any person
who violates this section is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he
shall be guilty of a felony of the third
degree.

Sosa at 345.
38

violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and federal
constitutions.

The court rejected this argument, stating

Because the elements of appellant's separate
prosecutions differ, and either offense could
have been established without establishing
the other, the double jeopardy doctrine does
not apply in the instant case.
Id. at 346.
In this case, Appellant could not have committed the
aggravated robbery without violating the firearm enhancement
statute .23
In State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992 (Utah 1978), the
appellant, who apparently hit a person while shooting at cars
passing his across the freeway, was convicted of aggravated
22
Utah Constitution Article I section 12 provides that
"...nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.". United States Constitution Amendment V provides "nor
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb".
23

Compare section 76-6-302
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; ...

with Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203

if

the trier

of fact

finds

a firearm

or a

facsimile or the representation of a firearm
was used in the commission or furtherance of
the felony, the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years
to run consecutively and not concurrently...
39

assault, which was defined by Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103
(1978):
(1) a person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in section 76-510224 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious
bodily injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such
means or force likely to produce death or
serious bodily injury.
His sentence was increased pursuant to the firearm enhancement
statute, Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203, which provided,
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows: (3) In the
case of a felony of the third degree, for a
term not to exceed five years but if the
trier of fact finds a firearm was used in the
commission of the felony, the court may
additionally sentence the person convicted
for an indeterminate term not to exceed five
years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
Angus at 994.

The appellant argued that the application of the

firearm enhancement created two punishments for one offense.
at 994.

Id.

The court rejected this argument, explaining that the

legislature was acting within its bounds in prescribing in two
separate statutes additional punishment for crimes committed with
dangerous weapons in general, and even more severe punishment for
crimes committed with the more dangerous of dangerous weapons 24

Section 76-5-102 provided, in part:
(1) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another.
40

firearms*

Angus at 995.
In the instant case, the legislature was not attempting

to distinguish in two statutes between the punishments for two
distinguished evils (dangerous weapons and more dangerous
firearms) in two separate statutes - both statutes involved in
the instant case call for unique punishment for use of a firearm.
In allowing Appellant to be punished twice for the same
offense# the trial court violated Appellant's rights under the
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Utah and federal constitutions.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Appellant's conviction for
aggravated robbery and remand this case to the trial court for a
new trial and for sentencing consistent with Appellant's rights
under the Double Jeopardy clauses of the Utah and federal
A

constitutions.
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ADDENDUM

Constitution of Utah, Article I, section 12
In criminal prosecutions the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend in
person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in
which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused
person, before final judgment, be compelled
to advance money or fees to secure the rights
herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense.
United States Constitution Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a
capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand
Jury, except in cases arising in the land or
naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for
the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy
of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,

and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence.
United States Constitution Amendment XIV
•..nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203
A person who has been convicted of a
felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of
the first degree, for a term at not
less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by
law, and which may be for life but
if the trier of fact finds a
firearm or a facsimile or the
representation of a firearm was
used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the
court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of
one year to run consecutively and
not concurrently; and the court may
cidditionally sentence the person
convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently...
Utah Code Ann. section 76-5-103
(1) a person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in section 76-51021 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious
bodily injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such
means or force likely to produce death or
Section 76-5-102 provided, in part:
(1) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another.

serious bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-6-302
(1) A person commits aggravated robbery
if in the course of committing robbery, he:
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a
deadly weapon; or
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon
another.
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of
the first degree.
(3) For the purposes of this part, an
act shall be deemed to be "in the course of
committing a robbery" if it occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission of,
or in the immediate flight after the attempt
or commission of a robbery.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-503(1)
Any person who is not a citizen of the
United States, or .any person who has been
convicted of any crime of violence under the
laws of the United States, the state of Utah,
or any other state, government, or country, .
. . shall not own or have in his possession
or under his custody or control any dangerous
weapon as defined in this part. Any person
who violates this section is guilty of a
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off shotgun he
shall be guilty of a felony of the third
degree.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-10-505
Every person who carries a loaded
firearm in a vehicle or on any public street
in an incorporated city or in a prohibited
area of an unincorporated territory within
this state is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 14
(a) A subpoena to require the attendance
of a witness or interpreter before a court,
magistrate or grand jury in connection with a
criminal investigation or prosecution may be
issued by the magistrate with whom an

information is filed, the county attorney on
his own initiative or upon the direction of
the grand jury, or the court in which an
information or indictment is to be tried.
The clerk of the court in which a case is
pending shall issue in blank to the
defendant, without charge, as many signed
subpoenas as the defendant may require.
(b) A subpoena may command the person
to whom it is directed to appear and testify
or to produce in court or to allow inspection
of records, papers or other objects. The
court may quash or modify the subpoena if
compliance would be unreasonable.
(c) A subpoena may be served by any
person over the age of 18 years who is not a
party. Service shall be made by delivering a
copy of the subpoena to the witness or
interpreter personally and notifying him of
the contents. A peace officer shall serve
any subpoena delivered to him for service in
his county.
(d) Written return of service of a
subpoena shall be made promptly to the court
and to the person requesting that the
subpoena be served, stating the time and
place of service an by whom service was made.
(e) A subpoena may compel the attendance
of a witness from anywhere in the state.
(f) When a person required as a witness
is in custody v/ithin the state, the court may
order the officer having custody of the
witness to bring him before the court.
(g) Failure to obey a subpoena without
reasonable excuse may be deemed a contempt of
the court responsible for its issuance.
(h) Whenever a material witness is about
to leave the state, or is so ill or infirm as
to afford reasonable grounds for believing
that he will be unable to attend a trial or
hearing, either party may, upon notice to the
other, apply to the court for an order that
the witness be examined conditionally be
deposition. Attendance of the witness at the
deposition may be compelled by subpoena. The
defendant shall be present at the deposition
and the court shall make whatever order is
necessary to effect such attendance.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51
....

The court shall not comment on the evidence
in the case, and if the court states any of

the evidence, it must instruct the jurors
that they are the exclusive judges of all
questions of fact.
Utah Rule of Evidence 801
[hearsay is defined as] a statement, other
than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
Utah Rule of Evidence 802
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided
by law or by these rules.
Utah Rule of Evidence 804
(a) "Unavailability of a witness"
includes situations in which the declarant:
(1) is exempted by ruling of
the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying
concerning the subject matter of
his statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to
testify concerning the subject
matter of his statement despite an
order of the court to do so; or
(4) is unable to be present or
to testify at the hearing because
of death or then existing physical
or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing
and the proponent of his statement
has been unable to procure his
attendance by process or other
reasonable means.
....

(b) The following are not excluded by
the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness:
....

(3) A statement which was at the time of
its making so far contrary to the declarant's
pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far
tended to subject him to civil or criminal
liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the
statement unless he believed it to be true.
A statement tending to expose the declarant

to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible
unless corroborating circumstances clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the
statement.
18 U.S.C. section 924(c)
(c) Whoever —
(1) uses a firearm to commit any felony
for which he may be prosecuted in a court of
the United States, or
(2) carries a firearm unlawfully during
the commission of any felony for which he may
be prosecuted in a court of the United
sTates, "shall, in addition to the punishment
provided for the commission of such felony,
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for
not less than one year not more than ten
years. In the case of his second or
subsequent conviction under this subsection,
such person shall be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for not less than two nor more
than twenty-five years and, notwithstanding
any other provision of law, the court shall
not suspend the sentence in the case of a
second or subsequent conviction of such
person or give him a probationary sentence,
nor shall the term of imprisonment imposed
under this subsection run concurrently with
any term of imprisonment imposed for the
commission of such felony.
18 U.S.C. sections 2113(a) and (d)
(a) Whoever, by force and violence, or
by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any
property or money or any other thing of value
belonging to, or in the care, custody,
control, management, or possession of, any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association; or
Whoever enters or attempts to enter any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan
association, or any building used in whole or
in part as a bank, credit union, or in such
savings and loan association, or building, or
part thereof, so used, any felony affecting
such bank, credit union, or such savings and
loan association and in violation of any
statute of the United States, or any larceny

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.
•• • •

(d) Whoever, in committing, or in
attempting to commit, any offense defined in
subsections (a) and (b) of this section,
assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the
life of any person by the use of a dangerous
weapon or device, shall be fined not more
than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than
twenty-five years, or both.

